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I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was signed into law in
December of 1977.1 Congress believed that the corporate bribery
scandals during the early 1970s shook public confidence in American
corporations.2 Following inquiries by the U.S. Senate and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC),3 Congress-concerned that
the disclosure of these dishonest corporate practices would seriously
undermine public confidence in the American business community-
enacted the FCPA.4
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1,494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. Pamela J. Jadwin & Monica Shilling, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
677, 677 (1994). An example of corruption for which the FCPA was enacted to curtail was a $1.4
million bribe that Lockheed gave to the Prime Minister of Japan, resulting in his conviction and
imprisonment. Id. at 677 n.3. Also, "payments by Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil, Gulf and other
corporations to the Italian Government caused the Italian President to resign and strained
United States relations with Italy." Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be
Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431. 433 (1987).
3. Jadwin & Shilling, supra note 2, at 677-78.
4. Id. at 677 n.4 (noting that "[o]f 97 companies listed in the final SEC report, 77 admitted to
or were suspected of questionable or outright illegal payments to foreign political or commercial
interests").
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This Article examines the effect of the FCPA on companies' contri-
butions to charitable organizations. Part II reviews the background of
the FCPA and discusses the elements of an FCPA violation. Congress
tasked two agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC,
with authority to enforce the FCPA. Part III examines the SEC's re-
cent civil enforcement action concerning charitable giving under the
FCPA. It also analyzes a handful of advisory opinions issued by the
DOJ regarding charitable giving and the FCPA. Part IV considers
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the context of FCPA enforce-
ment. It provides hypothetical situations illustrating companies' use
of CSR to disguise acts of bribery and examines any chilling effect
that the FCPA has on companies' charitable giving. Part V proposes a
model FCPA compliance program, including the creation of a Charita-
ble Contributions Compliance Committee (CCCC), to address chari-
table donations as an area of risk. It also provides a roadmap of the
due diligence required to minimize liability under the FCPA for com-
panies making charitable contributions.
II. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. Background of the FCPA
During the Watergate investigation into President Nixon's cam-
paign contributions, a widespread practice of bribery by U.S. compa-
nies to obtain business in foreign countries was uncovered.5
Politicians feared that this practice would "undermine[ ] public confi-
dence in the business community and tarnish[ ] America's image
abroad." 6
For example, the Prime Minister of Japan was forced to resign after
he accepted payments from Lockheed Corp.7 Reports also showed
that Lockheed Corp. paid Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands $1 mil-
5. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global An-
tibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward
the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (1999); see also S. REP.
No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4,098, 4,101 (noting that SEC investiga-
tions at the time of the report revealed corrupt payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving
hundreds of millions of dollars); Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 749, 750 n.2 (2011) (noting that "[t]he FCPA is also the byproduct of the Watergate
Scandal: after discovering unreported campaign contributions, the SEC initiated an investigation
into payments to domestic and foreign political officials by corporations").
6. Jadwin & Shilling, supra note 2, at 678.
7. Id. at 677. "Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, and other high government officials were top-
pled from power amid revelations of approximately $12 million in illegal payoffs from the Lock-
heed corporation, which were paid since the [1950s] to secure airplane sales contracts from the
Japanese government." Bruce A. Gragert, Yakuza: The Warlords of Japanese Organized Crime,
4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 160 (1997).
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lion, and the ensuing scandal eventually compelled him to relinquish
his official functions.8 The extensive media coverage of these events
led the SEC to investigate a number of companies and to institute a
voluntary disclosure program.9
The FCPA was enacted "to bring . .. corrupt practices to a halt and
to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business
system."' 0 A 1977 Senate Report, discussing the enactment of the
FCPA, stated that "[c]orporate bribery is bad business."" This report,
along with the reports of widespread corrupt payments by corpora-
tions, reflects why the FCPA was needed to curb corporate bribery
and restore the confidence of investors in America and abroad.12
B. Provisions of the FCPA
The FCPA is composed of "accounting and record-keeping provi-
sions" and "anti-bribery provisions."' 3
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1,
78dd-2, and 78dd-3,14 prohibit "any promise, offer, or payment of any-
thing of value if the offeror 'knows' that any portion will be offered,
given, or promised to a foreign official, foreign political party, or can-
didate for public office for the purpose of influencing a governmental
decision."' 5
8. Longobardi, supra note 2, at 433.
9. Id. "In the 1970s, the SEC announced its voluntary disclosure program concerning the
suspected widespread practice of public companies maintaining off the books slush funds, which
were used to make payments ... [to] government officials in business transactions." William R.
McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 624 (2006) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"The results were stunning: Hundreds of [U.S.] corporations came forward with disclosures
about the existence of such funds and the use of these off the books accounts to facilitate all
manner of questionable payments." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4.
11. Id.
12. William Alan Nelson II, Attorney Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Legal
and Ethical Challenges and Solutions, 39 U. MEM. L. REv. 255, 258 n.11 (2009).
13. Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Re-
cord-Keeping Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
465, 467 (2006).
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Deming, supra note 13, at 467 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3).
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a. "Corrupt" Intent
For a payment to violate the FCPA, it must be given "corruptly." 16
The term corruptly is not specifically defined in the FCPA, but the
legislative history of the FCPA provides some guidance. The legisla-
tive history signifies that Congress viewed the term corruptly to con-
note an action that was done with a bad intent.'7 In a 1977 House
Report,18 Congress stated that the word corruptly in the FCPA was
intended to have the same meaning as in 18 U.S.C. § 201, which is the
federal statute criminalizing the bribing of a federal official.' 9
United States v. Liebo is the seminal case that analyzes the meaning
of the term corruptly under the FCPA.20 In Liebo, the defendant,
Liebo, was convicted for violating the FCPA because he gave a Niger
government official airline tickets for his honeymoon in order to influ-
ence another official who was the relative and friend of the Niger offi-
cial. 21 The court found that there was sufficient evidence that these
"tickets were given to obtain or retain business." 22 The relevant evi-
dence included the fact that Liebo classified the airline ticket as a
"commission payment" for accounting purposes 23
The district court judge instructed the jury:
[Tihe offer, promise to pay, payment or authorization of payment,
must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official posi-
tion or to influence someone else to do so, and that an act is cor-
ruptly done if done voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad
16. See David P. Burns & Erin K. Sullivan, Navigating the FCPA's Complex Scienter Require-
ments, GIBSON DuNN (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
Burns-Sulivan-NavigatingTheFCPAComplexScienterReq.pdf.
17. See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 245 (1997).
18. H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977).
19. Id. at 7. The statute states whoever "directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or
promises anything of value to any public official ... with intent (A) to influence any official act;
or (B) to influence such public official . .. to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow,
any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) to
induce such public official ... to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such
official or person . . . shall be fined under this title." 18 U.S.C. § 201(b); see United States v.
Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A] fundamental component of a corrupt act is a
breach of some official duty owed to the government or the public at large.") (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The common
thread that runs through common law and statutory formulations of the crime of bribery is the
element of corruption, breach of trust, or violation of duty.").
20. United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
21. See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law
in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 691, 721 (2007).
22. Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1311.
23. Id. at 1312.
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purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a law-
ful end or result by some unlawful method or means.24
The Eighth Circuit held that "the instructions as a whole adequately
instructed the jury that a gift or gratuity does not violate the [FCPA]
unless it is given corruptly." 25
b. "Anything of Value"
"The term anything of value has been defined primarily by case
law." 26 Federal courts have consistently given broad meaning to the
phrase anything of value in interpreting federal criminal statutes. 27 It
is important for companies to recognize that there does not have to be
a direct monetary benefit to the foreign official for an FCPA violation
to occur.2 8 "Items found to be of value include the following: money;
gifts; discounts; use of resources (materials, facilities, and equipment);
entertainment; luxuries (food, travel, meals, lodging); promises for fu-
ture employment; and insurance benefits."29
c. "Knowledge" Requirement
The knowledge requirement, in respect to conduct, is met when that
person is aware or has a firm belief that he or she is making an im-
proper payment.30 The knowing standard is broad and does not nec-
essarily require actual knowledge. 31 The legislative history of the
FCPA shows that recklessness is not enough for the knowledge re-
quirement; however, "willful blindness" will be seen as meeting the
knowledge requirement.32
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See Ned Sebelius, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 579, 588 n.61
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th Cir. 1986); see also JAY
GRENIG ET AL., 2 FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 27.10 (6th ed.) ("'[A]nything of value' means any
item, whether tangible or intangible, that the person giving or offering or the person demanding
or receiving considers to be worth something . . . [i]nclud[ing] a sum of money, favorable treat-
ment, a job, or special consideration.").
28. See Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 647, 658-59 &
n.68 (2010).
29. Id. at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006).
31. United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant has
sufficient knowledge of the conspiracy even though he consciously avoided actual knowledge of
the purposes and objectives of the conspiracy).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 919 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1,547, 1,952-53 (noting that the knowing standard includes "both prohibited actions that are
taken with actual knowledge of intended results as well as other actions that, while falling short
of what the law terms positive knowledge, nevertheless evidence a conscious disregard or delib-
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d. "Foreign Official"
The term "foreign official" is defined in the FCPA as "any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or in-
strumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such gov-
ernment or department." 33 This term has recently been challenged in
regard to whether the FCPA applies to officers and employees of
state-owned entities (SOEs). 34 The defendants in these cases argue
that the plain language and legislative history of the statute with re-
gard to "instrumentality" excludes SOEs.3 5 In Aguilar, U.S. District
Judge Howard Matz denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, con-
cluding that employees of SOEs can be foreign officials for purposes
of the FCPA.36 In Carson, U.S. District Judge James Selna denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss and stated that the "ordinary meaning
of instrumentality indicates that state-owned companies could fall
under the ambit of the FCPA. Whether such companies do, in fact,
qualify as an instrumentality is a question of fact."37 The court listed a
number of factors to determine whether a business entity constitutes a
government instrumentality, including "(1) the foreign state's charac-
terization of the SOE and its employees; (2) the degree of control by
the foreign state; (3) the purpose of the entity's activities; and (4) the
extent of government ownership, including level of financial
support."3 8
The DOJ has also recently provided guidance on who qualifies as a
foreign official. In the recently released Resource Guide to the U.S.
crate ignorance of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability
of violations of the [FCPA]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
34. See generally United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2011); United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
35. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4, *7; Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 n.3. For an in-depth
analysis of whether an employee of a state-owned corporation can be prosecuted for a violation
of the FCPA, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-03 (Sept. 1,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpalopinion/2010/1003.pdf.
36. See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (holding that a state-owned corporation could have
been an instrumentality of a foreign government within the meaning of the FCPA). Officers of
such a state-owned corporation, as two employees were alleged to be, could have been foreign
officials within the meaning of the FCPA. See id.; see also Steven Mikulan & Aruna Viswanatha,
Judge Upholds DOJ Definition of "Foreign Official", MAIN JUSTICE: JUST ANTI-CORRUPTION
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/2011/04/01/judge-upholds-doj-def-
inition-of-foreign-official/.
37. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. See Paul T. Friedman et al., FCPA Update: Another Challenge to DOJ's Expansive "For-
eign Official" Definition Fails, but Clarifies DOJ's Burden, MORRISON FOERSTER, 2 (June 2,
2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110602-FCPA-Update.pdf.
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the DOJ states that "the FCPA broadly
applies to corrupt payments to any officer or employee of a foreign
government and to those acting on the foreign government's be-
half."39 The guide also states that "[t]he term instrumentality is broad
and can include state-owned or state-controlled entities. Whether a
particular entity constitutes an instrumentality under the FCPA re-
quires a fact-specific analysis of an entity's ownership, control, status,
and function." 40 As a guide, companies can assume that, based upon
the guidance provided by the DOJ, "an entity is unlikely to qualify as
an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority
of its shares." 4 1
The FCPA also includes certain public international organizations.
Under the FCPA, a public international organization is defined as (1)
"an organization that is designated by Executive order pursuant to
section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act" or (2)
"any other international organization that is designated by the Presi-
dent by Executive order for the purposes of this section, effective as of
the date of publication of such order in the Federal Register." 42 "Cur-
rently, only eighty-three organizations have such designation by exec-
utive order."43 The inclusion of public international organizations is
particularly important in the context of charitable giving because or-
ganizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
United Nations, and the World Health Organization are subject to
FCPA enforcement. 44
39. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUr PRACTICEs ACT 20 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlightlfcpalfcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
40. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For examples of jury instructions relating to what
factors courts look at to determine government ownership, see Jury Instructions and Order at 5,
United States v. Esquenazi, No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2011), ECF No. 309; Car-
son, 2011 WL 5101701; and Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & Exca. COMew'N, supra note 39, at 21. However,
practitioners must be aware that the resource guide also comments on situations where this will
not be true. "[A] French issuer's three subsidiaries were convicted of paying bribes to employ-
ees of a Malaysian telecommunications company that was 43% owned by Malaysia's Ministry of
Finance. There, notwithstanding its minority ownership stake in the company, the Ministry held
the status of a 'special shareholder,' had veto power over all major expenditures, and controlled
important operational decisions." Id.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006).
43. F. Joseph Warin et al., The British Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Brib-
ery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 19 (2010).
44. See 22 U.S.C. § 288.
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e. "Obtain or Retain" Business
Under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(B), a violation of the FCPA occurs
only if a payment is made to obtain or retain business. The courts
have interpreted this statute very broadly; for instance, the Fifth Cir-
cuit has found that it applies to obtaining favorable rulings on tax
legislation.45
2. Record-Keeping Provisions
The FCPA books and records and internal controls provisions (re-
cord-keeping provisions) 46 apply only to issuers registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) 47 and issuers that
are required to file reports under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). 48 Because only
issuers are subject to the requirements of the record-keeping provi-
sions, they are not as widely applicable as the anti-bribery provi-
sions.49 The record-keeping provisions mandate accountability for the
disposition of assets and transactions of issuers.50 In addition, the is-
suer must have acted knowingly to be liable under the record-keeping
provisions.5'
3. Exceptions and Affirmative Defenses
The sole exception to the FCPA covers payments made to foreign
officials to secure performance of a "routine governmental action." 52
The FCPA defines a routine governmental action as one that is ordi-
narily and commonly performed by a foreign official in:
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qual-
ify a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or
scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across country;
45. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 748 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that prohibition
against payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain business "was sufficiently broad to in-
clude bribes meant to affect administration of revenue laws").
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)-(7).
47. Id. § 78a.
48. Id. (concerning the registration and regulation of brokers and dealers).
49. Robin Miller, Annotation, Construction and Application of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977, 6 A.L.R. FED. 2d 351 (2005).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
51. See United States v. Jensen, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("Congress
merely intended to protect parties who inadvertently violate the Books & Records statute. As a
result, a person can be criminally convicted for a Books & Records violation if the government
proves that they acted willfully-that is, knowing the falsification to be wrongful, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(a)-and acted knowingly-that is, deliberately and not by accident.").
52. See Baker, supra note 28, at 662.
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(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commod-
ities from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.53
However, the routine governmental action exception excludes:
any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to
award new business to or to continue business with a particular
party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the deci-
sion-making process to encourage a decision to award new business
to or continue business with a particular party.54
The affirmative defenses to the FCPA include payments made that are
legal under the written laws of the foreign official's country and pay-
ments that are reasonable and bona fide expenditures.55 The first af-
firmative defense-payments legal under the written laws of the
foreign official's country-can be raised only when the written laws in
a foreign official's country authorize the payment; the defense may
not be based on practice or custom. 56 To assert the affirmative de-
fense of payments that are reasonable and bona fide expenditures, the
payment must be directly related to "the promotion, demonstration,
or explanation of products or services" or "the execution or perform-
ance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof."57
The company charged with an FCPA violation must affirmatively
plead the defenses and show that its payment met the requirements.58
4. Enforcement and Penalties
The DOJ and the SEC share the enforcement powers for the anti-
bribery and record-keeping provisions. 59 The DOJ is responsible for
all criminal and civil enforcement (except with respect to registrants)
of the anti-bribery provisions, as well as criminal enforcement of the
record-keeping provisions. 60 The SEC is responsible for civil enforce-
ment of both the anti-bribery and the record-keeping provisions with
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)-(v).
54. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B).
55. Id. § 78dd-l(c)(1)-(2).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1,547, 1,955 ("[A] payment to a foreign official is lawful under the written laws and regulations of
the foreign official's country. (emphasis added). The Conferees wish to make clear that the
absence of written laws in a foreign official's country would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy
this defense." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2)(A)-(B).
58. See McSorley, supra note 5, at 765 n.108.
59. John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-Plough and the In-
creasing Scope of SEC Enforcement, 61 Bus. LAw. 135, 141 (2005).
60. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat.
1,107, 1,416-17 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3).
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respect to registrants. 61 There is considerable overlap, and the two
enforcement agencies often collaborate on investigations. 62 The criti-
cal distinction between the record-keeping provisions and the anti-
bribery provisions is the absence of any requirement of knowledge or
intent in the record-keeping provisions in order for the government to
prove a civil case. 63
The law imposes criminal and civil penalties on individuals and
companies for FCPA violations.64 A company that commits a criminal
violation of the anti-bribery provisions may be fined up to $2 million
per violation and is subject to civil penalties of $10,000 per violation.65
Civil violations of the record-keeping provisions can lead to injunc-
tions, the disgorgement of profits, and other remedies. 66
III. CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE FCPA
Corporate philanthropy is very important in the global marketplace.
William Ford, Jr., former CEO of Ford Motor Company, once said
that the distinction between a good company and a great company is
that "a good company delivers excellent products and services, a great
one delivers excellent products and services and strives to make the
world a better place." 6 7 Many companies seek to be good corporate
citizens through gifts to charity and social responsibility projects. 68
The FCPA has implications for corporate charitable giving and social
responsibility projects that many multinational companies engage in
throughout the world.69
A. In re Schering-Plough
The only case to date of an action brought against a company for
charitable donations under the FCPA is SEC v. Schering-Plough
61. See id.
62. Giraudo, supra note 59, at 141.
63. Id. at 142.
64. E.g., Justin Serafini, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 738-39
(2004).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A)-(B).
66. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (setting out alternative fines).
67. William Clay Ford, Jr., Chairman's Message: Ford in the 21st Century, WILEY (Mar. 11,
1999), http://www.wiley.com/collegelkieso/0471363049/dt/analysttool/realco/ford/chairman.htm.
68. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corpo-
rate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 587 (1997) ("Corporate charitable contributions
amount to several billion dollars in aggregate on an annual basis.").
69. See Dan Kadlec, Charitable Giving: How Companies Are Doing More with Less, TIME
(June 5, 2012), http:/Ibusiness.time.com/2012/06/05/charitable-giving-how-companies-are-doing-
more-with-less/ (noting that "[t]he median level of corporate giving was $24.4 million in 2011").
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Corp.70 The SEC alleged that Schering-Plough Corp.71 violated the
record-keeping provisions of the FCPA.72 Without admitting or deny-
ing the SEC's allegations, Schering-Plough Corp. consented to a judg-
ment by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
that required Schering-Plough Corp. to pay a $500,000 civil penalty.73
In February 1999, Schering-Plough Poland (S-P Poland)74 made a
z3,000 (approximately $777) payment to the Chudow Castle Founda-
tion (Foundation).75 The founder and president of the Foundation
was the director of the Silesian Health Fund. 76 In 2000, the director of
the Silesian Health Fund solicited S-P Poland to make additional pay-
ments to the Foundation.77 Between March 2000 and March 2002, S-P
Poland's oncology unit manager arranged for twelve additional pay-
ments to the Foundation; some payments were structured so that they
were under the manager's approval limit, apparently for the purpose
of obscuring the nature of the payments.78 The manager also "pro-
vided false medical justifications for most of the payments on the doc-
uments that he submitted to [S-P Poland's] finance department." 79
The SEC found that between February 1999 and March 2002, S-P
Poland paid z315,800 ($75,860) to the Foundation.80 S-P Poland paid
more money to the Foundation than to any other recipient of promo-
70. See Complaint, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945, 2004 WL 2057340
(D.D.C. June 9, 2004) [hereinafter Schering-Plough Complaint].
71. Schering-Plough Corp. "is a New Jersey corporation with its headquarters in Kenilworth,
New Jersey. Its common stock is registered with the [SEC] pursuant to Section 12(b) of the
Exchange Act and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange." Id. 91 3.
72. Id. 91 2. The complaint specifically alleged that Schering-Plough Corp. violated sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. Id. IT 14-15.
73. In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 2032, 2004 WL 1267922 (June 9,
2004). Schering-Plough also agreed to hire an independent consultant to review and evaluate
Schering-Plough's internal controls, record-keeping, and financial reporting policies and proce-
dures as they related to the company's compliance with the FCPA. Id. at *4-5. The independent
consultant would be required to issue periodic reports to the SEC on the measures being imple-
mented as related to Schering-Plough's compliance with the FCPA. Id.
74. "Schering-Plough Poland ('S-P Poland'), headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, is a branch
office of Schering-Plough Central East AG, a wholly owned subsidiary of Schering-Plough Corp.
that is headquartered in Lucerne, Switzerland." Id. at *1.
75. Id. at *2. "Chudow Castle Foundation ('Foundation') is a charitable organization that was
established in 1995 to restore castles and other historic sites in the Silesian region of Poland." In
re Schering-Plough Corp., 2004 WL 1267922, at *1.
76. Id. "The Silesian Health Fund was a government body that ... provided monies for the
purchase of pharmaceutical products and influenced the purchase of those products by other
entities, such as hospitals, through the allocation of health fund resources." Id. at *2. It is one of
sixteen regional government health authorities in Poland. Id. at *1.
77. Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 70, 1 7.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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tional donations.8' "During 2000 and 2001, the payments to the Foun-
dation constituted approximately 40% and 20%, respectively, of S-P
Poland's total promotional donations budget." 82 Even more unusual
was the fact that the Foundation was the only recipient of multiple
donations. 83
The SEC also found that "[a]ll of the payments to the Foundation
were classified by S-P Poland in its books and records as donations.
However, while the payments in fact were made to a bona fide char-
ity, they were made to influence the Director [of the Silesian Health
Fund] with respect to the purchase of [S-P Poland's] products." 84
"During the period in which the payments were being made to the
Foundation, S-P Poland's sales of Intron A and Temodal, two of its
oncology products, increased disproportionately compared with sales
of those products in other regions of Poland."85 The oncology unit
manager did not view the payments as charitable, "but as dues that
were required to be paid for assistance from the Director [of the Sile-
sian Health Fund]."8 6
The SEC also found that prior to March 2002, Schering-Plough
Corp.'s policies and procedures for detecting possible FCPA violations
by its foreign subsidiaries were inadequate.87 The policies and proce-
dures did not require employees to conduct any investigation or due
diligence prior to making charitable donations to determine whether
government officials were affiliated with the recipients, and for this
reason, the director of the Silesian Health Fund's relationship was
never considered by S-P Poland as a potential FCPA issue.88
The SEC found that Schering-Plough Corp. should have been
alerted to the fact that there were FCPA issues relating to S-P Po-
land's donations to the Foundation because (1) "the Foundation [was]
not a healthcare related entity, yet still received payments;" 89 (2) the
proportion of the payments to the Foundation in relation to the com-
pany's budget for charitable donations; (3) the structuring of the pay-
ments by the oncology unit manager that apparently allowed him to
81. Id. 8.
82. Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 70, 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. 9.
85. Id. 1 10.
86. Id. 9.
87. In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 2032, 2004 WL 1267922, at *1, *3
(June 9, 2004).
88. Id. at *3.
89. Id. S-P Poland's internal policies provided that promotional donations generally were
supposed to be made to healthcare institutions and relate to the practice of medicine. Id. at *3
n.5.
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exceed his authorization limits; and (4) the president of the Founda-
tion was the director of the Silesian Health Fund, who had the ability
to influence the purchase of S-P Poland's products by hospitals within
the Silesian Health Fund.90
Schering-Plough is significant for a number of reasons. It is the only
case to date where a company was charged with an FCPA violation for
making contributions to a charitable organization. 91 The case suggests
that companies could be held liable for FCPA violations if they fail to
install internal controls to analyze links between government officials
and the activities of their foreign subsidiaries, including when making
charitable contributions. 92 The case is also significant because the Po-
lish government official did not personally benefit from the payments;
all of the donated funds went to the Foundation.93 The SEC took the
view that regardless of whether the Polish government official person-
ally benefitted from the payments, the payments were still improper
because of his relationship to the Foundation. 94 The case also evi-
dences a critical distinction between the enforcement authority of the
SEC and the DOJ under the FCPA95: the SEC does not need to prove
bribery to bring an action against a company under the record-keep-
ing provisions of the FCPA.96
Schering-Plough involved payments being made by a foreign sub-
sidiary of a U.S. company.97 The SEC found that Schering-Plough
Corp.'s policies for detecting possible violations by its foreign subsidi-
aries were inadequate. 98 This finding is very important, especially
with the number of multinational corporations who have subsidiaries
in different countries throughout the world.99 The FCPA imposes the
duty to implement internal controls directly on the parent company,
allowing the SEC to hold the parent company responsible for any in-
adequate internal controls at a subsidiary that failed to prevent and
detect improper payments. 00
90. See Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 70, [ 13.
91. Giraudo, supra note 59, at 151.
92. See id. at 136.
93. Id. at 151.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 136.
96. Giraudo, supra note 59, at 136.
97. See generally In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 2032, 2004 WL
1267922 (June 9, 2004).
98. Id.
99. See List of Multinational Corporations by Country, INVESTMENTS & INCOME, http://www.
investmentsandincome.comlinvestments/1ist_mnc-by-country.html (last visited May 14, 2013).
100. Internal Control Failures Lead to Parent Liability for a Subsidiary's FCPA Violations,
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (June 2, 2009), http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/ad3385
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Schering-Plough raises many additional questions concerning the
scope of FCPA enforcement in regard to charitable contributions.
How will the rationale from Schering-Plough be applied to other cases
of charitable giving? What if, instead of the president, the Polish gov-
ernment official had just been a member of the board of directors for
the Foundation? What if the Polish government official had no associ-
ation with the charity, but his spouse or child was a member of the
board of directors of the Foundation? What if, instead of the director
of the Silesian Health Fund, the Polish government official was Minis-
ter of Education or Minister of Finance?
Under the facts of Schering-Plough, because of the way the pay-
ments were structured and reported, it probably would not have made
a difference whether the Polish government official served as a board
member rather than the president of the Foundation or even if it was a
family member who served as a board member of the Foundation. 01
The Polish government official was still able to influence the hospital's
purchasing decisions within the Silesian Health Fund. If, instead of
the director of the Silesian Health Fund, the Polish government offi-
cial were Minister of Education or Minister of Finance, the payments
would probably not have violated the FCPA.102 If the Polish govern-
ment official did not have the influence over the purchasing of S-P
Poland's products, and the payments were not made to gain an im-
proper advantage, the payments to the Foundation would not have
violated the FCPA.
B. Wynn Resorts
In February 2012, after an investigation by former Nevada Gover-
nor Robert Miller and Louis Freeh, the ex-director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, Wynn Resorts Ltd. Director Kazuo Okada was
asked to resign based upon allegations that Okada violated U.S. anti-
corruption laws by making cash payments and gifts worth about
$110,000 to foreign gambling regulators.103 Earlier, in January 2012,
Okada had "sued Wynn in Nevada seeking information about a $135
million donation to the University of Macau, among other things.
Okada called the donation inappropriate because the final installment
96-312b-4c83-af02-e5ac48dce9e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/32b60431-2eb2-48d3-8fb
2-08f843854e2d/FCPA-060209-Internal-Control-Failures-Lead-to-Parent-Liability-for-a-Subsidi-
ary.pdf.
101. See Giraudo, supra note 59, at 152.
102. See id.
103. Dan Hart, Wynn Resorts Redeems Director Okada's Stake After Probe, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-21/wynn-resorts-re-
deems-director-okada-s-stake-after-probe.html.
346 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:331
is due in ten years, when Wynn Macau's gaming license is set to
expire."1on
On February 8, 2012, following Mr. Okada's lawsuit, the Com-
pany received a letter from the Salt Lake Regional Office of the
[SEC] requesting that, in connection with an informal inquiry by the
SEC, the Company preserve information relating to the donation to
the University of Macau, any donations by the Company to any
other educational charitable institutions, including the University of
Macau Development Foundation, and the Company's casino or con-
cession gaming licenses or renewals in Macau.105
In its February 2012 SEC filing, Wynn Resorts stated that the dona-
tion "was consistent with the Company's long-standing practice of
providing philanthropic support" and was made only after "an exten-
sive analysis which concluded that the gift was made in accordance
with all applicable laws." 106 However, a Wall Street Journal article
reported that the board of the university foundation includes "current
and former government officials" and "a member of the committee to
elect Macau's chief executive," who is the chancellor of the
university. 07
Even though case law reflects that there is no private cause of ac-
tion for an FCPA claim, 08 the Wynn situation emphasizes that FCPA
investigations can spawn from unrelated civil ligation. This example
reflects the importance of adequate controls as to charitable dona-
tions, which are discussed in detail in this Article.109
C. DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases
The DOJ has issued multiple FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases
(FCPA Opinions)1 0 concerning whether charitable contributions
104. Richard L. Cassin, Wynn Resorts Boots Non-Compliant Director, Shareholder, THE
FCPA BLOG (Feb. 20, 2012, 2:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/20/wynn-resorts-
boots-non-compliant-director-shareholder.html.
105. Wynn Resorts, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 13, 2012).
106. Id.
107. Kate O'Keeffe & Alexandra Berzon, Macau School Ties Roil Wynn Resorts, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 2, 2012, 2:23 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204571404577253232255
305166.html.
108. See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1990).
109. See infra Part V(A).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e)(1) (2006) ("The Attorney General, after consultation with ap-
propriate departments and agencies of the United States and after obtaining the views of all
interested persons through public notice and comment procedures, shall establish a procedure to
provide responses to specific inquiries by issuers concerning conformance of their conduct with
the Department of Justice's present enforcement policy regarding the preceding provisions of
this section.").
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made by companies would violate the FCPA.111 The FCPA Opinions
state whether or not certain specified prospective conduct would vio-
late the current provisions of the FCPA.112 It is important to note that
"[t]he entire transaction which is the subject of the request must be an
actual-not a hypothetical-transaction but need not involve only
prospective conduct. However, a request will not be considered un-
less that portion of the transaction for which an opinion is sought in-
volves only prospective conduct." 113
It is also important to note that "an FCPA Opinion will not bind or
obligate any agency other than the [DOJ]. It will not affect the re-
questing issuer's or domestic concern's obligations to any other
agency, or under any statutory or regulatory provision other than
those specifically cited in the particular FCPA Opinion."114
An FCPA Opinion will state only the Attorney General's opinion as
to whether the prospective conduct would violate the [DOJ's] pre-
sent enforcement policy under [the FCPA]. If the conduct for which
an FCPA Opinion is requested is subject to approval by any other
agency, such FCPA Opinion shall in no way be taken to indicate the
[DOJ's] views on the legal or factual issues that may be raised
before that agency, or in an appeal from the agency's decision.115
For example, if a company requests an FCPA Opinion on a pro-
posed action, the company could still face civil or criminal charges
brought by another government agency or jurisdiction even if the
DOJ decides not to take action. 116 In the context of the FCPA, it
would most likely be the SEC bringing a claim under the FCPA; it is
important to note that the SEC has a lower burden of proof for prose-
cuting an FCPA violation.' 17
111. See generally Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpalopinion/2010/1003.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013). Since 1993, the DOJ has
issued thirty-six Opinion Procedure Releases. See id. Five of these opinions discuss the FCPA
implications of prospective charitable contributions. See id. These five opinions are discussed at
length in the body of this Article.
112. See 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2012) (noting that the FCPA Opinion Procedure allows "issuers and
domestic concerns to obtain an opinion of the Attorney General as to whether certain specified,
prospective-not hypothetical-conduct conforms with the Department's present enforcement
policy regarding the antibribery provisions of the [FCPA]").
113. Id. § 80.3.
114. Id. § 80.11.
115. Id. § 80.13.
116. See id.
117. See Giraudo, supra note 59, at 136.
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1. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 95-01
The DOJ received a request by a U.S.-based energy company.118
The energy company planned to acquire and operate a plant in a
country in South Asia that lacked modern medical facilities in the re-
gion where the plant was located. 119 A modern medical complex was
under construction near the plant and its costs of the medical facility
were projected to run in excess of $100 million. 120 Once the acquisi-
tion of the plant was completed, the energy company planned to do-
nate $10 million to the medical facility for "construction and
equipment" costs.121
The donation would be made through a charitable organization in-
corporated in the United States and through a public limited liability
company located in the South Asian nation (foreign PLLC). 122 The
energy company represented that it would "require certifications from
all officers of the [U.S. charity] and the [foreign PLLC] that none of
the funds will be used, promised or offered in violation of the
FCPA."123 The energy company also represented that none of the
persons employed by or acting on behalf of the charity or foreign
PLLC were affiliated with the South Asian government.124 In addi-
tion, the energy company represented that it would require audited
financial reports from the U.S. charity, accurately detailing the disper-
sal of the donated funds.125 Based upon these facts, the DOJ did not
intend to take any enforcement action with respect to the prospective
donation for the construction and equipment of the medical facility
described in the request. 126
2. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 97-02
The DOJ received a request by a U.S.-based utility company. 127
The utility company had begun construction of a plant in an Asian
country that lacked adequate education facilities in the region. 128 An
elementary school was being built near the location of the plant, and
118. U.S. Dep't of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 95-01 (Jan. 11, 1995), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1995/9501.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 95-01, supra note 118.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. U.S. Dep't of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02 (Nov. 5, 1997), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/1102.pdf.
128. Id.
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the costs to build the school were projected to exceed $100,000.129
The utility company intended to donate $100,000 to the school con-
struction project; the donation would be made "directly to the govern-
ment entity responsible for the construction and supply of the
proposed elementary school." 130
The utility company represented that it would "require a written
agreement from the government entity that the funds would be used
solely to construct and supply the elementary school." 131 The written
agreement would set forth other conditions to be met, including
"guaranteeing the availability of land, teachers, and administrative
personnel for the school [and] guaranteeing timely additional funding
of the school project in the event of any financial shortfall." 3 2 Based
upon the fact that the donation would not be given to any specific
foreign official but, instead, would be made directly to a government
entity, the DOJ opined that the FCPA did not appear to apply to the
proposed donation and that it did not intend to take any enforcement
action with respect to the prospective donation.133
3. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 06-01
The DOJ received a request by a Delaware corporation headquar-
tered in Switzerland (Delaware Corporation). 134 The Delaware Cor-
poration sought to "contribute $25,000 to a regional Customs
department of the Ministry of Finance [(Ministry)] in an African
country as part of a pilot project to improve local enforcement of anti-
counterfeiting laws."135 The Delaware Corporation sought to make
the monetary contribution to the Ministry in order for the agency to
"fund incentive awards to local customs officials to improve local en-
forcement relating to seizures of counterfeit products bearing the
trademarks of the [Delaware Corporation] and its competitors."136
According to the Delaware Corporation, a transit tax was collected
on all goods transiting the country, even those that were contraband
or counterfeit.137 The salaries of local customs officials include a small
percentage of any transit tax they collect, regardless of whether they
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02, supra note 127.
133. Id.
134. U.S. Dep't of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpalopinion/2006/0601.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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were authentic or counterfeit products, meaning that "there [was] a
financial disincentive for thorough inspection by local customs offi-
cials of goods."138
The Delaware Corporation represented that in connection with the
$25,000 contribution, it would execute a formal memorandum of un-
derstanding (MOU) with the Ministry to "encourage the mutual ex-
change of information related to the trade of counterfeit products"
and establish procedures for incentive programs for local customs offi-
cials who seize counterfeit products.139 The Delaware Corporation
also represented that it would establish "procedural safeguards de-
signed to assure that the funds made available by the [Delaware Cor-
poration's] contribution were, in fact, going to . . . local customs
officials for the purposes intended."140 The Delaware Corporation
also represented that it would monitor the incentive program and take
no part in choosing which customs officials received the incentive
award.141
The Delaware Corporation represented that its pending business
activities in the African country were relatively small and unrelated to
its request for an FCPA Opinion and further represented that its fu-
ture business in the African country was not dependent upon the do-
nation to the customs program and that the donation was not intended
to influence any foreign official to obtain or retain business.142 Based
upon these facts, the DOJ did not intend to take any enforcement
action with respect to the prospective donation; however, the FCPA
Opinion included two caveats.143 The caveats stated that the FCPA
Opinion should not be deemed to endorse the language used in the
MOU and that the FCPA Opinion did not "apply to any monetary
payments made by the [Delaware Corporation] for purposes other
than those expressed in the letter of request."1 44
4. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 09-01
The DOJ received a request by a U.S. company that designs and
manufactures medical devices.145 In March 2009, representatives of
the U.S. company visited a foreign country to meet with a senior offi-
138. Id.
139. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
145. U.S. Dep't of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 09-01 (Aug. 3, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpa/opinion/2009/0901.pdf.
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cial of a government agency (Senior Official). 146 During the visit, the
Senior Official explained that the government intended to "purchase
the medical devices, and then subsidize the cost of such devices when
it resells them to patients."147 The Senior Official informed the U.S.
company that all manufacturers would be allowed to participate in
tenders for government purchases of the medical devices, but it would
only "endorse products that it ha[d] technically evaluated with
favorable results."148
Because the foreign government was not familiar with the U.S.
company's devices, the Senior Official asked the U.S. company to pro-
vide free sample devices to government health centers for testing.149
The U.S. company was also to provide accessories for the medical de-
vices free of charge, as well as follow-up support; the approximate
value of the devices and related items and services was about $1.9
million.150
The recipients for the sample devices were to be selected from a list
of candidates-provided by the participating medical centers-by a
working group of health care professionals who were experienced
with that specific type of medical device.15 The U.S. company's coun-
try manager in the foreign country, who was a physician, would "par-
ticipate in the working group that evaluates and selects patients who
will receive the donated devices;"' 5 2 it was also noted that the country
manager had received FCPA training in January 2008 and March 2009.
To ensure fairness and transparency in the selection process, the
names of the recipients would be published. 53 Further, the close fam-
ily members of the foreign government agency's officers or employ-
ees, working group members, or employees of the health centers who
would be participating in the selection process or in testing and evalu-
ating the medical devices
will be ineligible to be recipients under the program unless (a) the
government-employed relatives of such recipient hold low-level po-
sitions and are not in positions to influence either the selection or
testing process; (b) the government-employed relatives of such re-
cipient clearly meet the requisite economic criteria; and (c) the re-
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 09-01, supra note 145.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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cipient is determined to be a more suitable candidate than
candidates who were not selected based on technical criteria.154
The evaluation of the donated medical devices would be based on
objective criteria, and the U.S. company represented that it had no
reason to believe that the Senior Official, who suggested providing the
devices, would personally benefit from the donation of the devices.'55
Based upon the fact that the donation would be made directly to a
government entity, and not to any specific foreign official, the DOJ
opined that the FCPA did not appear to apply to the proposed dona-
tion and that it did not intend to take any enforcement action with
respect to the prospective donation.156
5. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 10-02
The DOJ received a request by a U.S.-based microfinance institu-
tion (USMFI) whose mission was to provide loans and basic financial
services to low-income entrepreneurs. 157 USMFI was "in the process
of converting all of its local operations to commercial entities that
[were] licensed as financial institutions, in order to permit them to
attract capital and expand their services." 158 One of the operations
was a wholly owned subsidiary in a country in Eurasia (Eurasian Sub-
sidiary) that was overseen by an agency of the Eurasian country (Reg-
ulating Agency).159
The Eurasian Subsidiary had been "seeking to transform itself from
its ... status as an institution regulated by the Regulating Agency into
an entity that would [have permitted] it to apply for regulation by the
Central Bank of the Eurasian country, with the ultimate goal of ac-
quiring a license as a bank."1 60 The Regulating Agency had taken a
skeptical view of such transitions, expressing concern that allowing
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to "transition from humanitarian sta-
tus (under which MFIs cannot distribute dividends to shareholders) to
commercial status could result in grant funds and their proceeds that
originally were intended for humanitarian assistance in the Eurasian
country either being withdrawn from the country or being used to
benefit private investors."1 6
154. Id.
155. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 09-01, supra note 145.
156. Id.
157. U.S. Dep't of Justice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02 (July 16, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2010/1002.pdf.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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The Regulating Agency insisted that the Eurasian Subsidiary make
a grant to a local MFI in an amount equal to approximately one third
of the Eurasian Subsidiary's original grant capital.162 The Regulating
Agency provided a list of local MFIs in the Eurasian country and
stated that the Eurasian Subsidiary could not fulfill its localization ob-
ligation unless it provided grant funding to one or more of the institu-
tions listed.163
USMFI was concerned that compelled grants to a specified institu-
tion, without appropriate safeguards, raised red flags under the
FCPA.164 USMFI resisted the Regulating Agency's efforts to compel
it to make such grants, but the Regulating Agency rejected alternate
proposals as inconsistent with its policy.165 The Regulating Agency
did state that the "Eurasian Subsidiary could engage in due diligence
of the local MFIs and could . . . impose controls on the use of grant
funds."166
The Eurasian Subsidiary undertook a three-stage due diligence pro-
cess to select the proposed grantee. 167 First, "it conducted an initial
screening of ... potential grant recipients by obtaining publicly availa-
ble information and information from third-party sources."168 Sec-
ond, it "request[ed] and review[ed] key operating and assessment
documents for each organization, as well as conducted interviews with
representatives of each MFI to ask questions about each organiza-
tion's relationships with the government . . . to elicit information
about potential corruption risk."169 Third, it "identif[ied] any ties to
specific government officials, determine[d] whether the organization
had faced any criminal prosecutions or investigations, and assess[ed]
the organization's reputation for integrity."170 The third round of due
diligence uncovered that one of the board members for the selected
MFI was a sitting government official in the Eurasian country.171
However, the sitting government official served in a capacity that was
completely unrelated to the microfinancing industry, and under the
law of the Eurasian country, sitting government officials may not be
compensated for that type of board service.172 The proposed grant
162. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
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was also subject to significant controls proposed by USMFI, including
staggered payment of grant funds, ongoing monitoring and auditing,
earmarked funds for capacity-building, prohibition on compensating
board members, and anti-corruption policy provisions. 73
The DOJ found that the Eurasian Subsidiary's proposed grant to
the local MFI was for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in
the Eurasian country-the proposed grant "would be made as a con-
dition precedent to obtaining a license to operate as a financial institu-
tion."174 The real issue was whether the proposed grant would
amount to the "corrupt giving of anything of value to any officials of
[the Eurasian] country in return for obtaining or retaining busi-
ness. "175 The DOJ further found that based on the due diligence that
was done and with the benefit of the controls that would be put into
place, it was unlikely that the payment would result in the corrupt
giving of anything of value to such officials.176 The DOJ also refer-
enced FCPA Opinions 95-01, 97-02, and 06-01 in its discussion to illus-
trate the due diligence and controls required to avoid violating the
FCPA when making a charitable contribution.177
D. What We Have Learned
It is instructive to look at the FCPA Opinions to see when the DOJ
will take action on companies' charitable contributions. By examining
the FCPA Opinions, there are four main areas of concern for the DOJ
when deciding whether or not to take enforcement action on a pro-
posed charitable contribution. The first area of concern is if any offi-
cial of the charity is affiliated with the foreign government where the
payment is being made. The second area of concern is whether the
payment is being made to a foreign official or, instead, is being given
directly to a foreign government entity. The third area of concern is
the level of control and monitoring a company plans to implement
once it makes the payment. The final area of concern is whether there
is a "compelled giving" law that mandates a company to make a con-
tribution to the community where it is investing or conducting busi-
ness. It is important to note that these areas of concern will often
overlap.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
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1. No Officials of the Charity Affiliated with Foreign Government
The risk of an FCPA violation is reduced if a company makes the
payment to a charitable organization that is not affiliated with a for-
eign government or foreign official. In FCPA Opinion 95-01, the U.S.-
based energy company certified that it had conducted an investigation
and represented that "none of the persons employed by or acting, on
behalf of the charitable organization or the limited liability company
are affiliated with the foreign government."178 However, this is not
always the end of the analysis.
For example, assume you are a medical device manufacturer. You
are selling medical devices in an African country and are approached
by the director of a hospital in the African country who proposes, that
by donating money to the local charity that provides healthcare for
low income families, he will make sure that his hospital and all other
hospitals in the region will buy your company's medical devices. You
have completed due diligence and found that there are no government
officials employed by the charity or serve on its board of directors.
Under this set of facts, there would not be an FCPA violation because
you are donating money to a charity at the request of a private com-
pany, i.e. the hospital.179 However, now assume that the hospital is
run by the state. Under this set of facts, there may be a violation of
the FCPA. You would be donating money to a charity to influence the
hospital's decision on which products to buy. Remember that there
does not have to be a direct monetary benefit to the government offi-
cial or employee of an SOE for an FCPA violation to occur.180 The
donation is also being made to gain an improper business advantage in
the African country. A court would look at the factors, including the
foreign state's characterization of the SOE, the degree of control by
the foreign state, the purpose of the entity's activities, and the extent
of government ownership.181 Based upon the answers to these inquir-
ies, the medical device manufacturer may violate the FCPA by making
the donation to the charity at the request of the director of the state-
owned hospital.
178. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 95-01, supra note 118.
179. This hypothetical is derived from the facts in FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 95-
01. See id.
180. "Although not defined within the FCPA or legislative history, the DOJ, SEC, and the
courts have interpreted anything of value expansively." Baker, supra note 28, at 658-59 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
181. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *3, *4 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2011).
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It is also routine practice for companies to employ the use of con-
sultants and agents in a foreign country.18 2 This can be very cost ef-
fective for companies; the consultants and agents have a good working
knowledge of local customs and the local business system. However,
there are also situations where companies utilize consultants and
agents to make payments to foreign charities; this situation will be
discussed later in the Article. 83
2. Payments Made Directly to Foreign Government
If a company makes the payments directly to a foreign government
entity, they are outside the scope of the FCPA. In FCPA Opinion 97-
02, the DOJ stated that "[a]s the requestor's donation will be made
directly to a government entity-and not to any foreign government
official-the provisions of the FCPA do not appear to apply to this
prospective transaction."1 8 4 In FCPA Opinion 06-01, the DOJ stated
that "the proposed provision of 100 medical devices and related items
and services fall outside the scope of the FCPA in that the donated
products will be provided to the foreign government, as opposed to
individual government officials." 85
By analyzing these FCPA Opinions, it is reasonable to assume that
the DOJ will not take action on donations made by companies directly
to a foreign government agency. However, these FCPA Opinions are
troublesome in that they seem to give companies room to circumvent
the FCPA. Assume you are counsel to a U.S. mining company. The
company plans to donate $50,000 for the construction of a hospital.
The director of the foreign government entity that grants mining con-
tracts assures the U.S. company that it will receive certain mining con-
tracts, which it would normally have had to bid on, by making the
contribution. The charitable contribution is being made directly to
the foreign government entity that is completing the construction of
the hospital. The U.S. company is making the donation specifically to
secure certain mining contracts in the foreign country. Would this
contribution be a violation of the FCPA?
The U.S. mining company is making a charitable contribution to
obtain mining contracts upon which it would otherwise have to bid;
however, the contribution is being made directly to a foreign govern-
182. Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1447, 1455 (2008).
183. See infra Part IV(B)(4).
184. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02, supra note 127.
185. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
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ment entity.18 6 The U.S. mining company will argue that because the
charitable contribution payment was made directly to a foreign gov-
ernment entity and that because it was properly recorded, there
should be no FCPA liability. However, it can be argued that the for-
eign government official is still receiving a benefit because the dona-
tions were subjectively valued by the official and provided him with an
intangible benefit of enhanced prestige.187 Companies must be aware
that, even though the charitable contribution is given directly to a for-
eign government entity, they may still be held liable for an FCPA
violation.
3. Control and Monitoring of Charitable Contributions
If the company making the payment represents that there will be
ongoing control and monitoring of the payment once it has been
made, the DOJ appears to be less likely to take enforcement action.
In FCPA Opinion 95-01, the U.S.-based energy company stated it
would require "audited financial reports from the U.S. charitable or-
ganization, accurately detailing the disposition of the donated
funds."' 88 In FCPA Opinions 97-02 and 06-01, the DOJ did not take
action, in part, because there was a written agreement with the recipi-
ent of the payment restricting the use of funds.189 Companies must be
aware that by having a strong FCPA compliance and training program
and performing due diligence, they can greatly reduce the chance of
an FCPA violation. This issue will be discussed in further detail later
in the Article.190
4. "Compelled Giving" Laws
In FCPA Opinion 10-02, the requesting company was being forced
by a foreign government agency to make a grant to a local institution
to ensure its grant capital remained in the Eurasian country.191 The
186. See, e.g., FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02, supra note 127; see also FCPA
Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
187. See Mike Koehler, A Double Standard? Part III, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Sept. 30,
2010. 5:11 AM), fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/09/double-standard-part-iii.html ("S-P Po-
land's bona fide charitable donations constituted a thing of value to the foreign official because
the donations were subjectively valued by the official and provided him with an intangible bene-
fit of enhanced . . . prestige." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 95-01, supra note 118.
189. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02, supra note 127; see also FCPA Opinion
Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
190. See infra Part V(B).
191. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
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foreign government agency also limited the number of entities that
could receive the grant.192
These "compelled giving" laws are not altogether uncommon. In
Venezuelan energy service contracts with the national oil company,
Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the law requires that the for-
eign company agree to invest an established percentage of the profits
from each contract into the community in which it operates.193 The
amount of the investment is negotiated with the Venezuelan govern-
ment and can include cash or in-kind contributions of computers,
equipment, or appliances to schools, communities, or organizations.194
Although legal and a practice required by law in Venezuela, these
payments have generated some questions with regards to compliance
with the FCPA and similar laws of other countries.195 While not a
payment to a governmental official, it is still a payment to a govern-
mental entity for the purpose of securing a contract.196 Further, it is
possible that a governmental official sits on the board of the local
charity in question; this may be present in contracts for infrastructure
opportunities, including communications and transportation ser-
vices.197 Other countries, including Nigeria and Angola, have laws
mandating foreign companies to enter into contracts that require them
to partner with local businesses in order to obtain licenses or conduct
business.198 Reports from TRACE International also show that public
officials routinely ask companies operating in Ukraine for targeted
192. Id.
193. Thomas Fox, Compelled Giving and the FCPA, INFOSEC ISLAND (Aug. 2, 2010), https://
www.infosecisland.com/blogview/6026-Compelled-Giving-and-the-FCPA.html.
194. Id.
195. See Thomas Fox, Plotting a Steady Course in Venezuelan Business, LATIN LAWYER, July
16, 2010, at 2 ("While not a payment to a governmental official, it is still a payment to a govern-
mental body for the purpose of securing a lucrative contract and, as such, requires careful
consideration.").
196. In two FCPA Opinions, the payment was being made directly to a foreign government or
foreign government agency. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02, supra note 127;
FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
197. In two FCPA Opinions, the U.S. companies requesting DOJ guidance were involved in
infrastructure projects in the foreign country. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02,
supra note 127; FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
198. Richard Craig Smith et al., DOJ Issues FCPA Guidance on Government-Compelled
Grants, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. (July 30, 2010), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/us/
knowledge/publications/93903; see also Angola: Investment Climate Statement for 2012, EMBASSY
OF THE U.S.: LUANDA, ANGL., http://angola.usembassygov/pol-econ-sectionlinvestment-climate-
statement-2010.htmi (last visited May 15, 2013) ("In the oil and diamond sectors, contracts with
the government spell out the commitments companies make to invest in infrastructure and social
services to benefit local communities, such as building schools, equipping hospitals, or funding
microcredit programs.").
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corporate charitable donations. 199 To give insight on the compelled
giving issue, Congress specifically stated that "[t]he defense that the
payment was demanded on the part of a government official as a price
for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a contract would not suf-
fice since at some point the U.S. company would make a conscious
decision whether or not to pay a bribe."200
In FCPA Opinion 10-02, the DOJ did not intend to take action be-
cause of the due diligence completed by USMFI, including research
on the list of companies provided by the foreign government agency,
staggering the payment of grant funds, ongoing monitoring and audit-
ing, and anti-corruption compliance provisions. 201 But what if USMFI
had not undertaken such rigorous due diligence? What if USMFI had
not been allowed to select from a group of local businesses but, in-
stead, was forced to donate to a local business designated by the for-
eign government agency? If USMFI was then charged with violating
the FCPA, could it plead the affirmative defense that the payment was
required under the written laws of the foreign official's country? 202
Companies should be aware of the distinction between custom and
written laws because only the latter is an affirmative defense against
an FCPA claim.203 Any time that a government agency directs busi-
ness to a specific entity, local or not, companies should be wary of the
FCPA.
IV. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 204 has been debated as long
as corporations have existed. "For centuries legal, political, social,
199. See Charitable Contributions in Kiev, TRACE BLOG (July 16, 2009), http://traceblog.org/
2009/07/16/charitable-contributions-in-kiev/ ("While the donations seem to be made transpar-
ently and to legitimate, bona fide organizations, the fact that the official initiated the request for
the donation and received a personal benefit (even if not a direct, monetary benefit) clearly
warrants serious FCPA scrutiny.").
200. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4,098, 4,108.
201. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
202. It is important to remember that this is not an exception; it must be affirmatively pled by
a party charged with an FCPA violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2006).
203. U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT-PROHIBITION OF THE PAYMENT OF BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS 2 (Oct. 2011), available
at https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/fcpa.pdf ("In relying on the local law of the foreign country
as an affirmative defense for a payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value to a foreign
official, the law or regulation being relied upon, at the time of the conduct, must be written.
Local practice, custom, or other unwritten policies do not qualify as an affirmative defense."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
204. Corporate responsibility is the idea that a corporation takes responsibility for its actions
concerning effects on the environment and society. See Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation
Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL
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and economic commentators have debated CSR ad nauseam." 205 It is
a debate of continued relevance with the rapid growth of multina-
tional corporations. According to Merrick Dodd, a former Harvard
Law School Professor, "[B]usiness is permitted and encouraged by the
law primarily because it is of service to the community rather than
because it is a source of profit to its owners." 206 Thus, corporations do
not exist simply to increase the bottom line but to improve the general
welfare of society as well.2 0 7
However, a company's pursuit to become a good corporate citizen
can lead to unintended consequences. When does the pursuit of a
CSR program expose a company to liability under the FCPA? Also,
what effect does the FCPA have on a company's decision to make
charitable donations in certain parts of the world? These are ques-
tions that plague companies regardless of their size or the industry in
which they operate.
A. The FCPA's Effect on Charitable Contributions
The FCPA can have a tremendous effect on the amount and recipi-
ents of charitable contributions provided by companies. In a speech
on September 17, 2008, Bill Reinsch, President of the National For-
eign Trade Council, opined that the SEC enforcement actions against
Schering-Plough Corp. and others threatened with prosecutions in-
volving bona fide charitable contributions have cast a chilling effect
on CSR.208
Transparency International publishes a Corruption Perceptions In-
dex (the Index) that shows the perceived levels of corruption in each
INT'L L.J. 171, 172 (2007) ("CSR is an umbrella term that refers to a variety of initiatives ranging
from voluntary codes of conduct to programs whereby companies can undergo external audits to
verify the adequacy of their practices in a variety of areas of social concern. Although generally
lacking formal state power of sanction, these efforts look to international law for their normative
authority, intending to apply sometimes-latent international legal prescriptions directly to corpo-
rations." (footnote omitted)).
205. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Wel-
fare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1195, 1195 (1999).
206. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1149 (1932).
207. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992).
208. Bill Reinsch, President, Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, The Impact of Corruption on
Global Businesses (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?
Mode=view&articleid=1987&Category=All. But see NFTC Criticizes Broadening FCPA En-
forcement, Lawyers Disagree, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 24, 2008, at 2 (opining that Schering-
Plough was "not a harbinger of 'super aggressive cases' to come on charitable contributions").
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country.209 The Index ranks the countries by their level of perceived
corruption in order from least to most corrupt. Companies should be
aware of the level of corruption in the country where the charitable
donation is being made.210 For example, a company making a charita-
ble contribution in Venezuela will generally have a more onerous duty
of due diligence than a company making a donation to a charitable
organization in Denmark.211
The amount of perceived corruption in a country can affect a com-
pany's willingness to make charitable contributions in that country.
For example, after the recent earthquake in Haiti, many companies
were reluctant to invest in rebuilding Haiti because of the level of
corruption present in the country. A March 2010 Wall Street Journal
article quoted an American entrepreneur, who does business in the
Caribbean, saying that "the [FCPA] precludes legitimate U.S. entities
from entering the Haitian market. Haiti is pure pay to play." 212 In
March 2010, Tyler Cowen, the Holbert C. Harris Chair of Economics
at George Mason University, suggested that the U.S. needed to pass a
law mandating that the FCPA would not apply to payments or invest-
ment in Haiti.213
These are just a few examples of how the FCPA affects companies'
charitable contributions in countries that have high levels of perceived
corruption.
A 2009 Dow Jones Risk Compliance survey, announced in a press
release entitled "Confusion About Anti-corruption Laws Leads
Companies to Abandon Expansion Initiatives," found that 51% of
companies had delayed a business initiative as a result of the FCPA
and 14% had abandoned an initiative altogether. More recently, a
2011 survey by the accounting firm KPMG found that among execu-
tives surveyed in the United States and United Kingdom, "more
than 70% . .. agreed there are places in the world where business
cannot be done without engaging in bribery and corruption," and
209. See generally Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://trans-
parency.org/cpi20lO/results (last visited May 15, 2013).
210. Neither the DOJ nor the SEC has advised companies to consult the Index list before
making a payment or donation in a foreign country; however, companies should still be aware of
the perceived corruption in countries where they conduct business.
211. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 209 (showing that on a scale where
number 1 is the least perceived corrupt, Denmark is ranked number 1 and Venezuela is ranked
165).
212. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Democrats and Haiti Telecom, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575116030721437698.html.
213. Tyler Cowen, One of the Best Ways to Help Haiti: Modify FCPA, MARGINAL REVOLU-
TION (Mar. 15, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/03/one-
of-the-best-ways-to-help-haiti.html.
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that approximately 30% of the respondents indicated that they deal
with this risk by not doing business in certain countries. 214
In the context of charitable contributions, it is also important to
note that the term foreign official includes certain international orga-
nizations. 215 The International Committee of the Red Cross, the
World Health Organization, the United Nations, and the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria are all organizations subject
to the provisions of the FCPA.216 These organizations accept charita-
ble contributions that are used throughout the world to aid in the re-
covery of natural disasters or to support those who cannot support
themselves. It is important to note that many foreign aid organiza-
tions have ties to foreign governments, so companies must always be
aware that even if there is not a foreign official directly involved in the
transaction, the company may be held liable if it knows that money
will be funneled to a foreign official for an improper purpose. 217
B. Companies Using Corporate Social Responsibility to
Disguise Bribery
This Article has noted that CSR is a major part of companies' busi-
ness models and programs where companies contribute money and
support to charitable organizations in countries throughout the world.
But when does a company's philanthropy expose it to civil or even
criminal liability? This Article does not intend to deter companies
from donating money to charities; instead, its intention is to illustrate
situations in which a company could inadvertently run afoul of the
FCPA when making charitable contributions and, also, situations in
which a company uses CSR to disguise acts of bribery.
1. "Corrupt" Intent
The intent behind the donation must be researched to determine
whether a charitable contribution being made by a company will vio-
late the FCPA. For a charitable contribution to violate the FCPA, it
must be given with corrupt intent.218 Legislative history is informative
on when a payment will be deemed to be given corruptly. The legisla-
tive history signifies that Congress viewed the term corruptly to con-
214. Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search
of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 661, 665-66 (footnote omitted).
215. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1)(B), 78dd-2(h)(2)(B), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2006).
216. See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (noting that these organizations were designated by executive order).
217. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1,547, 1,953 (noting that the knowing standard, as seen from the legislative history, is very broad
and does not necessarily require actual knowledge).
218. See Burns & Sullivan, supra note 16.
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note an action that was done with a bad intent. 219 The legislative
history also indicates that corruptly connotes an evil motive and pur-
pose.220 Congress, in a 1977 House Report, stated that the word cor-
ruptly in the FCPA is intended to have the same meaning as in 18
U.S.C. § 201, which is the federal statute criminalizing the bribing of a
federal official.221
It is important to note the distinction between a company providing
charitable donations to an organization in the hope of garnering good-
will and a company providing charitable donations to an organization
for the sole purpose of obtaining some type of business advantage or
concession, such as tax breaks and favorable treatment.222 Companies
should not be deterred from making charitable donations based upon
an irrational fear of committing an FCPA violation; however, compa-
nies must be aware that if they disguise bribery as charitable giving,
they could be held liable for an FCPA violation.
2. Anti-Bribery v. Record-Keeping Provisions
Companies must be aware of the bifurcated system of enforcement
under the FCPA, especially when making charitable contributions.
Although a charitable contribution may not be recognized as a bribe,
a company may still face consequences depending on how it docu-
ments the contribution in its financial records. It is also important to
note that the burden of proof is much lower for an action brought by
the SEC as opposed to one brought by the DOJ.223
SEC v. NATCO Group, Inc. exemplifies this distinction.224 In
NATCO, TEST Kazakhstan, a subsidiary of NATCO, hired both ex-
219. See id.
220. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 918 ("The House receded to an amended Senate provision
which would prohibit payments to any foreign official for the purpose of influencing any act or
decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, or inducing such foreign official to do or
omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official. This language conforms to the
domestic bribery standard found at 18 U.S.C. 201." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(B) (2006).
223. See Miller, supra note 49, § 5 ("The court, in S.E.C. v. McNulty stated that the view that
scienter is not a prerequisite to civil liability under 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m is supported by the fact
that in 1988, Congress amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b) to provide that knowing falsification is
required before criminal liability shall be imposed." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basics of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance for the
Small Legal Department, Ass'N OF CORP. COUNs. (June 1, 2011), http://www.acc.com/legalre-
sources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-Compliance.cfm (noting that the SEC brings cases
under the record-keeping provisions of the FCPA as civil actions so its burden of proof is pre-
ponderance of the evidence).
224. Complaint, SEC v. NATCO Grp. Inc., No. 4:10-cv-98, 2010 WL 2003734 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
11, 2010).
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patriates and local Kazakh workers. 225 In 2007, "Kazakh immigration
prosecutors conducted audits and claimed that TEST Kazakhstan's
expatriate workers were working without proper immigration docu-
mentation. The prosecutors threatened to fine, jail or deport the
workers if TEST Kazakhstan did not pay cash fines." 226 Even though
NATCO was "paying extorted immigration fines," the SEC brought a
claim under the record-keeping provisions of the FCPA because its
"system of internal accounting controls failed to ensure that [it] re-
corded the true purpose of the payments." 227
The SEC enforcement action against Schering-Plough Corp. also il-
lustrates how a company can violate the record-keeping provisions of
the FCPA by not accurately reflecting charitable contributions in its
financial records. It is important to note that S-P Poland made chari-
table contributions to a bona fide charitable organization, and it char-
acterized the payments to the Foundation as donations.228 However,
the way the payments were structured allowed S-P Poland's oncology
unit manager to exceed his authorization limits, and he admitted that
he did not view the payments as charitable but instead viewed them as
dues that were required to be paid for assistance from the director of
the Silesian Health Fund.229
3. Contributions to Domestic Charity Involved in Charitable
Foreign Activities
Many charitable organizations in the United States are often in-
volved in charitable projects throughout the world. Many of these
charities are involved in projects in the most corrupt countries. What
happens to a company that makes a contribution to a domestic charity
that uses the contribution to bribe a government official? The FCPA
legislative history and case law have shown that a company cannot
turn a blind eye once the transaction is finished.230 What then is the
level of due diligence needed to avoid an FCPA violation for a dona-
225. Id. 5.
226. Id. 9 6.
227. SEC Files Settled Civil Action Charging NATCO Group Inc. with Violations of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, Litigation Release No. 21,374 (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr2l374.htm.
228. In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 2032, 2004 WL 1267922, at *2
(June 9, 2004); see supra Part III(C)(2).
229. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2004 WL 1267922, at *2.
230. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 919 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1,547, 1,952-53; see also United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 & n.37 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The element of knowledge may be satisfied by
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious
to him.").
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tion to a domestic charity that is involved in foreign charitable
activities?
For example, assume you represent a U.S. petroleum company that
has multiple projects in Mexico. The company plans to donate
$50,000 to a domestic charity that provides education to rural towns
throughout Mexico. On its face, this action would not seem to violate
the FCPA. Although the company does substantial business in Mex-
ico, it does not seem to be making the donation corruptly; there does
not seem to be a foreign official involved, and there is no evidence
that the company would obtain or retain business by making the
donation.
Changing the facts of the hypothetical, you find a document show-
ing that the company has knowledge of the domestic charity spending
more funds in certain areas of the country, and consequently, certain
legislative members, whose constituents are benefitted by the dona-
tions, are influencing the Mexican Energy Agency to award energy
contracts to the U.S. petroleum company. This would be a violation
of the FCPA. The U.S. petroleum company is being awarded energy
contracts without having to engage in the normal bidding process.
Certain legislative members are benefitting from having their constit-
uents happy and, therefore, voting for them in elections. The legisla-
tive members are also using their official authority to influence the
decision making power of the Mexican Energy Agency that grants the
energy contracts to the U.S. petroleum company.
As stated above, all of these cases revolve around the issue of intent
and whether the charitable contribution is made corruptly. In most
cases, the intent of the contribution will be inferred from the facts
surrounding the contribution and the behavior of the parties
involved.231
4. Corporate Social Responsibility Used to Disguise Bribery:
Hypothetical Situations
The grey area of when a donation is made corruptly and instances
where companies use CSR to disguise acts of bribery can be illustrated
by using several hypothetical situations.
231. See Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting
Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Set-
tlements, 18 Nw. J. Irrr'L L. & Bus. 303, 380 ("Concealment through falsification of books and
records can be strong evidence from which corrupt intent can be inferred.").
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Hypothetical A232: You represent a U.S. electronic device manufac-
turer that has a subsidiary in an African country. One of the manag-
ers of the company seeks your legal advice. The African subsidiary
has made several large contributions to a charity that provides clean
drinking water for people in remote areas of the country. Upon inves-
tigation, you discover that the director of the charity is the minister of
technology. Upon further investigation, you find that the minister is
using his power to influence decisions of local electronic companies
regarding which products to buy.
These donations will violate the FCPA. The donations are being
made to a charity whose director is a foreign official under the FCPA.
The donations are also specifically being made to the charity to influ-
ence the decision making of the foreign official and to obtain addi-
tional business in the African country. This is probably the most basic
and straightforward example of a company using CSR to disguise acts
of bribery.
The crux of these cases will be whether the donation is being given
corruptly.233 CSR is a very important part of a company's business,
and just because a contribution is made to a charitable organization
does not mean that a company should be worried about committing
an FCPA violation. The finding of a corrupt payment will be fact spe-
cific. 234 Was the payment made to influence the decision of a foreign
official? Was the payment made to the foreign official to obtain or
retain business?
Hypothetical B: An international company, headquartered in Dela-
ware (Delaware Company), has offices throughout the world, includ-
ing a large office in Japan that serves some of the firm's largest clients.
Because of the recent earthquake and tsunami, the Delaware Com-
pany plans to donate money to the Red Cross relief effort to resupply
Japanese citizens and rebuild Japan's infrastructure.
As outside counsel to the Delaware Company, you are being asked
to render an opinion on the legality of the donation. On its face, the
donation looks permissible; however, the Red Cross is one of the in-
ternational organizations designated as a foreign official under the
FCPA.235 Under this set of facts, the payment raises a red flag, but
after conducting due diligence, you find that the payment is being
232. Hypothetical A is derived from the facts of the Schering-Plough case. See generally
Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 70.
233. See Mathews, supra note 231.
234. See id.
235. See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
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given to a bona fide charity and is not being made corruptly or to gain
business in Japan. The donation does not appear to violate the FCPA.
Changing the hypothetical, upon investigation, you find that an em-
ployee of the Red Cross informed the Delaware Company that by
increasing the amount of the donation to the relief effort, the Red
Cross employee would use his position to influence the Japanese gov-
ernment to grant the Delaware Company contracts for the rebuilding
process. Under this revised set of facts, the donation would violate
the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. The donation is being made
to a foreign official under the FCPA. The donation is also being made
corruptly, i.e. to influence the decision making of the Japanese gov-
ernment to gain building contracts.236 Companies must be aware that
the language of the FCPA states that for a payment to violate the
FCPA, it must be made to influence any act or decision by a foreign
official in his official capacity or to secure any improper advantage. 237
In this hypothetical, depending on how the Delaware Company char-
acterized the donation in its accounting records, it could also be held
liable under the record-keeping provisions of the FCPA.238
Hypothetical C: You represent a U.S. company that has a subsidiary
in Indonesia. The CEO of the Indonesian subsidiary comes to you, as
counsel for the parent, seeking advice. He tells you that the subsidi-
ary donated a large sum of money to the UN Population Fund, which
provides medical care for many Indonesians who cannot afford it oth-
erwise, in order to obtain certain tax breaks by the Indonesian
government.239
Under this set of facts, the donation would be a violation of the
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. The donation is being made to
the UN, which is a foreign official under the FCPA.240 The donation is
also being made corruptly, i.e. in exchange for certain tax breaks pro-
vided by the Indonesian government. It is important to note that the
business purpose test under the FCPA is very broad.241
Hypothetical D: Assume you represent an international construc-
tion company, headquartered in New York (New York Company).
The New York Company is interested in participating in the Haiti re-
building effort; however, it has never conducted business in Haiti.
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A).
238. See United States v. Jensen, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
239. Hypothetical C is derived from the facts of Kay. See generally United States v. Kay, 359
F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
240. See 22 U.S.C. § 288.
241. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 755 (noting that the so-called business purpose test applies to
favorable tax rulings and other favorable legislation and regulation).
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The New York Company hires a Haitian consultant that is familiar
with the local laws and customs. On its face, the mere fact of hiring
the Haitian consultant is not illegal.
Changing the facts of the hypothetical, the Haitian consultant
knows that by making donations to the school where the minister of
infrastructure's children go to school, the country will give the New
York Company favorable treatment and assure the New York Com-
pany that it will be awarded with future building contracts in Haiti.
Under this set of facts, the New York Company could be held liable
for violating the FCPA. Because the New York Company provided
the consultant with money to use in acquiring business in Haiti, the
New York Company cannot just turn a blind eye to the consultant and
argue that it had no knowledge of such improper payments. The legis-
lative history and case law have shown that companies cannot show a
conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances
that should reasonably alert one to a high probability of FCPA viola-
tions.242 Because Haiti is perceived as one of the most corrupt coun-
tries in the world,243 the New York Company should have been aware
of the high probability of an FCPA violation when using a Haitian
consultant.244
Hypothetical E 2 4 5 : Assume you represent an international tobacco
company, headquartered in New York (Tobacco Company). The To-
bacco Company has a subsidiary in Venezuela. The Venezuelan sub-
sidiary entered into a contract with a Venezuelan charity. The
agreement was signed on behalf of the charity by its director, the wife
of the then-President of Venezuela. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, the subsidiary would make periodic donations to the charity to-
taling approximately $12.5 million. In exchange, the subsidiary would
obtain price controls on Venezuelan tobacco, eliminate controls on re-
tail cigarette prices in Venezuela, obtain tax deductions for the To-
bacco Company, and assure the Tobacco Company that Venezuela
242. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1,547,
1,953 (noting that the knowing standard includes "both prohibited action taken with actual
knowledge of intended results as well as other actions that, while falling short of what the law
terms positive knowledge, nevertheless evidence a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance
of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of
the [FCPA]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
243. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 209 (noting that Haiti is number 165
out of 176 countries).
244. See, e.g., id.
245. Hypothetical E is derived from the facts of Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024
(6th Cir. 1990).
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would not increase existing tax rates applicable to other tobacco
companies.246
Under this set of facts, the donations would violate the FCPA.
Even though no foreign official is directly affiliated with the charity,
the wife of the President of Venezuela is the director of the charity.
The President is using his influence as a government official to grant
benefits to the Tobacco Company, which would not have been granted
without the donations. The donations here are being made corruptly
and to obtain business because they are made in exchange for price
controls and tax deductions.
V. MINIMIZING LIABILITY
This Article has established that there are many challenges facing
companies that make charitable donations under the FCPA. This part
discusses solutions to those challenges so that companies can minimize
liability under the FCPA. It will discuss how a strong compliance pro-
gram and sufficient due diligence can greatly reduce the chance of an
FCPA violation.
A. FCPA Compliance Program
A strong FCPA and anti-corruption compliance program cannot be
underestimated. When one looks at the history of FCPA prosecutions
brought by both the SEC and DOJ, one observes that the first step
taken by the enforcement authority is to examine what type of pro-
gram a company had in place to monitor and control outside financial
payments and internal accounting controls.247 The SEC and DOJ
have expressed concerns that the failure to implement an effective
FCPA compliance program can allow "systemic cracks to form in cor-
porate compliance systems." 248 An FCPA compliance program means
"a single, documented, corporate plan designed to reduce the likeli-
hood that the company will engage in violations of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA, and to detect such violations and bring them
to the attention of senior management, if they occur." 249
To implement an effective FCPA compliance program, a company
must compile several basic categories of information concerning its
246. See generally id.
247. See Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 247, 264-66 (2010).
248. Id. at 268.
249. Id. at 265 n.68 (quoting Daniel L. Goelzer, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program:
Minimizing the Risks of Improper Foreign Payments, 18 Nw. J. IrT'L L. & Bus. 282, 282 (1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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activities. The three kinds of basic information that need to be col-
lected are "the risks of FCPA violations, the existing controls, and the
resources and commitment available to administer and monitor the
program." 250 With this information, the company can identify the
goals and objectives it wishes to accomplish through the FCPA com-
pliance program.251
Many companies have FCPA and anti-corruption compliance sys-
tems in place;252 however, many of these systems do not provide gui-
dance for situations involving charitable contributions. Traditionally,
this has not been an area of concern for deterring corruption.253 Com-
panies must be aware that a charitable contribution may seem innocu-
ous at first glance, but it can lead to grave consequences if made
illegally. Companies should continually update their compliance pro-
grams. Whenever a violation is discovered, "the compliance program
should be reviewed with a view to [determine] why the violation oc-
curred and whether changes should be made in the program to pre-
vent a reoccurrence." 254 Companies must also remember that a
compliance "program that tries to impose controls on every conceiva-
ble activity that might result in misconduct is likely to prove unwieldy
and, in the long run, unenforceable." 255
1. Proposed Model for Charitable Contribution
Compliance Programs
Companies must have a section in their respective FCPA compli-
ance programs devoted specifically to charitable contributions. This
Article does not suggest that a company's compliance program can be
written to cover every possible situation, but it can be modified to
minimize liability in the area of charitable contributions.
a. Elements
The first step a company must take is to identify charitable contri-
butions as an area of risk in its FCPA compliance program. For exam-
250. Goelzer, supra note 249, at 294.
251. Id.
252. See Michael Volkov, Anti-Corruption Compliance for Medium and Small Companies,
WHrrE COLLAR DEFENSE & COMPLIANCE (Apr. 16, 2011, 10:35 PM), http://michaelvolkov.blog-
spot.com/2011/04/anti-corruption-compliance-for-medium.html (noting that approximately 40%
of Fortune 500 companies do not have an FCPA or anti-corruption compliance program in
place).
253. See Michael Volkov, Bribery Risks and Charitable Giving, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COM-
PLIANCE (Apr. 18, 2012), http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/2012/04/bribery-risks-and-chari-
table-giving/.
254. Goelzer, supra note 249, at 291.
255. Id.
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ple, Det Norske Veritas (DNV), an international foundation
headquartered in Oslo, Norway, includes a statement in its Code of
Business Conduct concerning charitable contributions. It states, "We
shall not use charitable contributions and sponsorships as a subterfuge
for bribery. Charitable contributions and sponsorships shall be docu-
mented and open for disclosure." 256 This statement is a great example
of how companies can specifically include charitable contributions in
their FCPA and anti-corruption compliance programs. This language
will also prevent employees from later stating that they were not
aware of a company policy prohibiting this type of activity.25 7
The second element is to stipulate designated levels of approval for
charitable contributions and sponsorships and to designate a compli-
ance officer at a sufficiently high management level who is responsible
for overseeing the program.258 This entails stipulating the amount of
company funds that are allocated for donation to charitable organiza-
tions, designating which employees have the power to make charitable
contributions on behalf of the company, and supplying a list of accept-
able charitable organizations that have been researched and ap-
proved. This list should be reviewed and updated frequently.
The third element is to implement a pre-donation review system. 2 59
This system will review each proposed charitable contribution and re-
quire approval before it is made. This will allow companies the bene-
fit of review prior to the contribution being made, rather than having
to review the contribution in hindsight. The pre-donation review sys-
tem should include written provisions to conduct due diligence to en-
sure that the proposed foreign donee is a bona fide charitable
organization. 260 This due diligence should include obtaining organiza-
tional documents, financial statements and tax returns, information
about the organization's charitable programs, history, board of trust-
ees, key employees, and the identity and qualifications of the individu-
256. Code of Business Conduct, DNV, http://www.dnv.com/moreondnv/cr/businessethics/
codebusiness_conduct.asp (last visited May 15, 2013); see also Anti-Bribery Policy, TUDOR
ROSE INT'L, at 4, http://www.tudor-rose.com/pdfffRI-anti-bribery-Policy.pdf (last visited May
15, 2013) ("Bribes may even be disguised as charitable donations. Again, for that reason, dona-
tions we make are approved by resolution of the Board and recorded. Whilst individuals may of
course make personal donations to charity, they should not do so on behalf of the Company
without prior approval from the Managing Director.").
257. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1,547, 1,953.
258. See Volkov, supra note 252.
259. See generally HYPERDYNAMICS CoP., ANTI-BRIBERY POLICY AND PROCEDURES (2013),
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/HDY/0x0x527067/2e8db0e7-060f-498a-8e52-
b8473693581c/Anti BriberyPolicyProcedures-2011-2012-Engl.pdf.
260. See id. at 8.
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als administering the grant.261 Companies should also not place a de
minimis value on which contributions to review; employees could
abuse the system by spreading out one large contribution into several
smaller contributions that fall under the level for review. 2 62
The fourth element is to mandate that any sponsorship agreements
be in writing and state the consideration being provided by the com-
pany. 263 The fifth element is to mandate that all records of charitable
contributions and sponsorships be maintained, both locally and at the
headquarters of the company. 264 An original record should also be
kept electronically to prevent employees from arguing that a docu-
ment has been lost, misplaced, or destroyed.
The sixth element is for a company to create an electronic database
to track charitable contributions.265 The information stored in the
database will include the branch or subsidiary of the company making
the contribution, the name of the employee proposing the charitable
contribution, the name of the charitable organization, the location of
the charitable organization, the location where the donated funds or
products will be used, and the name of the employee who approved
the charitable contribution. This will make it easier for companies to
monitor charitable contributions and ensure that the donated funds or
products are being used for their intended purpose. It will also make
it easier for companies to see the areas where charitable contributions
are being made and what percentage of the company's total promo-
tional budget is being used.266 The database will make internal inves-
tigations run more smoothly because the companies will already have
all the information related to a particular charitable contribution
stored in one location.
The seventh element is for a company to keep a separate ledger
account in its accounting records for charitable contributions and
261. The due diligence required to minimize liability under the FCPA for companies making
charitable contributions is discussed in Part V(B).
262. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 70, 7 (noting that the payments were
structured so that they were at or below the manager's approval limit).
263. See, e.g., COTECNA INSPECTION SA, BUSINESS ETHics & COMPLIANCE CODE (2d ed.
2006), available at http://www.cotecna.chlen/About-Cotecna/-/media/Documents/PDFs/EN/
Cotecna%20Business%20Ethics%20and%20Compliance%2OCodeEN.ashx; INT'L FED'N OF
INSPECTION AGENCIES, COMPLIANCE CODE GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION (4th ed. 2012),
available at http://www.ifia-federation.org/content/wp-content/uploads/Guidelines-to_3rded_
IFIACompliance-Code -_4thEditionJuly_2012.pdf; TRANSPARENCY INT'L UK, THE 2010
UK BRIBERY Acr ADEQUATE PROCEDURES 16 (2010), available at http://www.transparency.
org.uklour-work/bribery-act.
264. See INT'L FED'N OF INSPECTION AGENCIES, supra note 263.
265. See GARY M. LAWRENCE, DUE DILIGENCE IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 12 (2004).
266. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Complaint, supra note 70, $ 8 (noting that payments to the
Foundation constituted 40% of S-P Poland's total promotional budget in 2000).
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sponsorships.267 In combination with the electronic database, this will
enable a company to have separate records of charitable contributions
being made by the company and its branches and subsidiaries.
The eighth element is for a company to prepare an annual manage-
ment statement on all charitable contributions and sponsorships made
by the company or on its behalf during that fiscal year.268 This would
be in addition to the company's annual report and whatever reports
they must create by law (e.g. 10-K, 10-Q, etc.).
The ninth and final element is for a company to implement a com-
prehensive FCPA and anti-corruption training program for all em-
ployees. 269 Training should be given to all employees, but it is
particularly important for managers and other employees who have
direct decision making power. Also, as noted above, it is important
for a company to engage in a review of its compliance program on no
less than an annual basis. A company should determine if its overall
program is effective both internally and externally. Additionally, a
company should assess any new best practices and whether those con-
cepts should be integrated into its FCPA and anti-corruption program.
If a company moves into a new business area or a new geographic
area, these new risks should be assessed, evaluated, and managed as
well.
A U.S. company making charitable contributions in a foreign coun-
try should adopt a company-wide compliance and ethics program de-
signed to prevent and address violations of the FCPA. Companies
must also include any foreign subsidiaries in a comprehensive FCPA
and anti-corruption compliance program. The FCPA imposes the
duty to implement internal controls directly on the parent company,
allowing the SEC to hold the parent company responsible for any in-
adequate internal controls at a subsidiary that failed to prevent and
detect improper payments.270 This is very important, especially with
the number of multinational corporations that have subsidiaries in dif-
ferent countries throughout the world. 271 As noted earlier in this Ar-
ticle, the SEC found that Schering-Plough Corp.'s policies for
267. See INT'L FED'N OF INSPECTION AGENCIES, supra note 263, at 5.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 2032, 2004 WL 1267922, at
*3 (June 9, 2004).
271. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONGRESS No.
RL32461, OUTSOURCING AND INSOURCING JOBS IN THE U.S. EcoNoMY: EVIDENCE BASED ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DATA 4 (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32
461.pdf ("By the end of 2008, there were more than 2,200 U.S. parent companies with more than
26,000 affiliates operating abroad . . . .").
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detecting possible violations by its foreign subsidiaries were
inadequate. 272
The U.S. government will take the existence of an FCPA and anti-
corruption compliance program into account when considering
whether to charge a company with FCPA violations and the level of
punishment for any substantiated FCPA violations. 273 However, the
mere existence of a program is not enough-it must have teeth and a
number of solid measures as delineated above. As Joseph E. Murphy,
board member at the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics,
stated:
Compliance with the FCPA is an area where faint-hearted efforts
will likely fail. The [FCPA] provides ambiguous standards and sets
thresholds of liability that can come as an unwelcome surprise to the
uninitiated. An effective program will be one that educates and
motivates the naive, and uses aggressive management techniques to
deter and ferret out willful misconduct such as bribery.274
b. Charitable Contributions Compliance Committee
A company should create a Charitable Contributions Compliance
Committee (CCCC) to implement and monitor the charitable contri-
butions section of its FCPA and anti-corruption compliance pro-
gram.275 The CCCC should be led by a representative from the
company's law department. It should be a cross-functional group of
executives that ensures that all charitable contributions made through
any of the company's business units are aligned and in compliance
with company policy. 2 76 The members of the CCCC must be given
specific training concerning charitable contributions as pertaining to
the FCPA and must continually attend trainings and seminars to stay
abreast of current developments in the area of charitable contribu-
tions under the FCPA. They should also meet bimonthly to discuss
implementation of compliance and ethics initiatives.
The CCCC should be granted powers to investigate all allega-
tions,277 and on a periodic basis, it should provide a report of allega-
272. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2004 WL 1267922, at *3.
273. See Salen Churi et al., Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Practical
Primer, ABA CRIM. JUST. SEC. ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE, Jan. 2012, at 23.
274. ETHICS PoINT, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AcT (FCPA): MANAGING RISK IN A NEW
ERA OF ENFORCEMENT 4 (2010).
275. For an example of a CCCC, see Corporate Citizenship Governance and Structure, Mc-
KESSON, http://2011.mckessoncorporatecitizenship.com/our-company/corporate-citizenship-gov-
ernance-and-structure (last visited May 15, 2013).
276. Id.
277. It is imperative for a company to have a system for employees to report violations (anon-
ymously if they wish) of company policies or other suspected illegal or unethical activity.
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tions and investigations to the company's senior management and its
board of directors. The CCCC's duties should include the following:
reporting to management on compliance matters and program effec-
tiveness; administering a compliance training program; coordinating
internal compliance monitoring activities; reviewing complaints, re-
ports, and questions received; coordinating investigations relating to
compliance matters; and, where necessary, ensuring that its company
takes corrective action.278
c. Whistleblower Protection Program
It is very important for a company to have "an effective internal
corporate system for reporting suspected criminal conduct and/or vio-
lations of the compliance policies, standards and procedures regarding
the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws for directors, of-
ficers, employees, and outside agents and business partners." 279 A
company should have a strong whistleblower program through the use
of a hotline or other appropriate mechanism, a clearly stated policy of
protection for any employee who reports such conduct through anon-
ymous reporting, and a clear no-retaliation policy. 280
Internal reporting mechanisms and whistleblower protection pro-
grams have become more important in light of the newly enacted
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
Dodd-Frank Act).281 Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act specifies
that a person who provides to the SEC "original information" of fraud
within the company that leads to an enforcement penalty of $1 million
or more may be entitled to collect between 10% and 30% of the pen-
alties enforced. 282 The provision also provides substantial retaliation
protections for whistleblowers. 28 3 Companies should be aware of the
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and structure their FCPA compli-
ance program to reflect these provisions. Many companies will likely
have to update their FCPA compliance programs to abide by the
Dodd-Frank Act provisions.
278. Corporate Citizenship Governance and Structure, supra note 275.
279. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of
Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CluM. L. REV. 153, 219-20 (2010).
280. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks to
Compliance Week 2010-5th Annual Conference for Corporate Financial, Legal, Risk, Audit &
Compliance Officers (May 26, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-tes-
timony/2010/05-26-10aag-compliance-week-speech.pdf.
281. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1,376, 1,841-42 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78pp (West Supp. 2010)).
282. Id.
283. See id.
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B. Due Diligence
Even if a company has a strong FCPA and anti-corruption compli-
ance program, it still must exercise due diligence when making chari-
table contributions. As noted above, compliance programs can
minimize liability but not erase it completely. Exercising due dili-
gence is very important when making charitable contributions. The
company must look at all the circumstances surrounding the donations
and also research the persons involved in the transaction. The due
diligence obligation is even more important for companies that make
contributions to charities in countries that have high levels of
corruption. 284
Outlined below is a roadmap for what due diligence a company
should engage in before making a charitable contribution.285 First, a
company must research the country where it is making the charitable
contribution. As discussed earlier in this Article, the company must
be aware of the level of corruption in the country where the charitable
contribution is being made.28 6 The company must also conduct due
diligence to ensure that the proposed foreign donee is a bona fide
charitable organization. 287 This should include obtaining organiza-
tional documents, financial statements and tax returns, information
about the organization's charitable programs, history, board of trust-
ees and key employee information, and the identity and qualifications
of the individuals administering the contribution.
The company should also require FCPA certifications from the
charitable organization.28 8 Before releasing any funds, the charitable
organization must certify in writing that none of the donated funds
will be used, promised, or offered in violation of the FCPA.28 9 Be-
cause of the complexity of the FCPA and the ambiguity of when a
payment will be made in violation of the FCPA, these certifications
might not have the deterrent effect that a company intended.
Next, a company must confirm that none of the charitable organiza-
tion's officers or board members is affiliated with the foreign govern-
ment. The typical situation would be similar to Schering-Plough,
where a foreign official was the director of the charitable organization.
However, in most cases it will be an indirect link to a foreign official,
284. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 209.
285. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157 (listing the due dili-
gence and controls implemented by companies in prior FCPA Opinions).
286. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 209.
287. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
288. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 95-01, supra note 118.
289. See id.
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such as a close relative or family friend, or a contribution made to an
international organization recognized as a foreign official under the
FCPA. There could also be cases where a high-level employee of a
SOE is the director of a charitable organization or on its board of
directors. Therefore, as discussed earlier, companies must engage in
due diligence when researching a charitable organization's link to a
foreign official or foreign government.
Even if a foreign official sits on the board of the charitable organi-
zation, it is not necessarily a de facto FCPA violation to make a chari-
table contribution to that organization. The company must look at
whether, under that country's laws, government officials can be com-
pensated for that type of board service and, also, whether the foreign
official serves in a capacity related to the business being conducted in
that country, allowing the official to create an improper business ad-
vantage for the company. 290
In addition, a company must require the charitable organization to
provide audited financial statements that accurately reflect the dispo-
sition of the donated funds. This will allow a company to know if the
donated funds are being used for their intended purpose. For exam-
ple, a company might donate money to a charitable organization for
building a school; however, based on audited financial reports, it
might find that the money was used for a different project or was used
in an illegal venture. The company could also use a written agree-
ment, signed by the company and the charitable organization, that re-
stricts the use of the donated funds. For example, in FCPA Opinion
97-02, the U.S. utility company used a written agreement that set forth
conditions on how the donated money was to be used.291 In FCPA
Opinion 06-01, the Delaware Corporation executed a formal MOU
that provided that the charitable organization retain five years of
records of the distribution of funds and would permit inspection of
those records at the request of the Delaware Corporation. 292
By completing the necessary due diligence, companies will be in a
much better position to avoid FCPA liability when making charitable
contributions. Using these steps, companies can identify potential lia-
bility issues and create an appropriate due diligence process that is
intentional, consistent, and systematic to ensure full transparency and
accountability.
290. See, e.g., FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 10-02, supra note 157.
291. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 97-02, supra note 127.
292. See FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 06-01, supra note 134.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Many companies see philanthropy as an important business prac-
tice. Companies seek to be good corporate citizens by making chari-
table contributions and donating to social responsibility projects such
as building schools and hospitals. This is even truer for multinational
companies that operate in emerging markets.
The area of charitable contributions under the FCPA is an ambigu-
ous area of the law in which liability for companies can be enor-
mous. 2 9 3 Companies must be aware that they can face liability under
the FCPA any time they make a charitable contribution, regardless of
whether the contribution is given to a charitable organization in the
United States that participates in projects in foreign countries or given
directly to a foreign charitable organization. By implementing a
strong FCPA and anti-corruption program and by completing suffi-
cient due diligence, a company can greatly minimize its liability before
making a charitable contribution.
293. "The U.S. government assessed nearly $2 billion in FCPA-related penalties and fines in
2010, and announced eight of the top ten FCPA settlements of all time." See Bethany Heng-
sbach & Anthony Navid Moshirnia, 2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act "FCPA" Year in Review,
NAT'L L. REv. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/2010-foreign-corrupt-prac-
tices-act-fcpa-year-review.
